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Introduction
Stephen Turner’s latest book, Explaining the Normative (2010), is an incisive and
important critique of what he calls ‘‘normativism.’’ Turner recognises that the
philosophical family that refers to and is enthusiastic about normativity is diverse—
for some, even those who would consider themselves members of it, it is really too
diverse to be thought of as a unit (e.g. Finlay 2010). Nevertheless, Turner asserts
that he has found ‘‘a common form of argument underlying various assertions about
the necessity or indispensability of the normative, and therefore of normativity’’
(p. 9). Further, he argues that this common form of argument contains ‘‘a large
number of genetic defects’’ (p. 9), it being the aim of the book to reveal them.
In the background here, as Turner himself confesses, is a reaction to his earlier
work, The Social Theory of Practices (1994). In that book, Turner criticised what
was fast becoming (and arguably still is) a popular concept in both philosophy and
the social sciences, namely practices. The reaction in question was that the book’s
arrows were blunt and ineffective, for they failed to target what is at the heart of the
concept of a practice: yes, you guessed it, normativity. As Turner himself recounts,
following the publication of that book, Joseph Rouse sent him a letter replying that
their normative nature immunised practices from Turner’s ‘‘intent to demolish’’
them.1 In this book, Turner sets out to hit the bull’s eye, fastening specifically on
normativity, and thereby hoping to finally pull the carpet out from beneath the
notion of practices.
Given the importance of his claim that normativist sympathies share a core, it
will be apt to turn first, in part one of this essay, to Turner’s account of it. Following
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that, in part two, it will be necessary to outline the principal features of Turner’s
criticism—to those ‘‘genetic defects’’ mentioned above. Turner’s book, however, is
not entirely negative; indeed, it will be important to look, in part three, at his
positive contribution, for in it—much to the surprise of the reader who is fed
extensive criticism of the normative in the first five out of six chapters—Turner
incorporates some elements of normativity, though in a softer, more modest form
than the normativism he attacks.
Turner’s criticism of what he characterises as normativism is important; it should
help us to tame the excessive ambitions of some versions of normativism. But it is in
his attempt to nevertheless find some room for the normative in his own account that
the real hope of the book lies. Throughout the first five chapters one often gets the
impression that Turner’s target is too much of a straw man and thus that his
construal of normativity is much too narrow, e.g. his ‘‘paradigmatic normativist’’ is
Hans Kelsen, not H.L.A. Hart, who Turner nevertheless calls ‘‘a normativist of
sorts’’ (p. 90). It is only when we get to his discussion of Donald Davidson,
supplemented by Max Weber, that we see Turner acknowledging a kind of
normativity that could meet and mingle with an equally modest naturalism.
Unfortunately, the reader gets only glimpses of this more positive aspect of the
book; they are almost drowned out in the intensely critical tone. One could argue
that providing a more extensive positive picture is not the book’s aim, but that is just
the rub. It is one thing to write a book (no matter how good the critical arguments
are) that further alienates those working on normativity; it is another to write a book
that warns against excessive normativist claims, while nevertheless striving to clear
a path towards a fruitful dialogue between normative intuitions and naturalistic
ones. I would have liked to have read the book as the second of the two, but there
are moments, to be discussed below, when Turner makes this difficult. In part three
of this essay, I try to nudge his positive contribution towards a middle path between
extreme forms of normativism and naturalism—a path I propose calling humanist
pragmatism.
Normativism
Before setting out the core features of normativism that Turner attacks, it will be apt
to point out the sheer range of this book, covering as it does many areas of
philosophy, including philosophy of the social sciences, legal philosophy, and
philosophy of language and mind. Composed of six chapters, together with a
substantial epilogue setting out the history of the debate, the book targets such
diverse thinkers as Wilfrid Sellars, Peter Winch, Hans Kelsen, Robert Brandom and
John McDowell. Turner has targeted some of these thinkers before (e.g. Kelsen in
Turner 2002), but never before has he pooled them all together into a sustained
attack on a common form of argument. What, then, is this common form?
The common form begins with ordinary facts that can be explained in the
ordinary stream of explanation. Within these facts, there is nothing ‘‘binding,
compelling, or constraining’’ (p. 9); but the normative does arise from those facts.
Once it has arisen, for instance in the form of norms, the normative enters or
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establishes a realm of phenomena that ‘‘do not directly cause behaviour, but they
regulate it normatively, by specifying what is the right way to say something, what
obligations one has, what one owes to others as a result of one’s meaningful actions,
and what is justified for others to do in response to your actions’’ (p. 9). This realm
of phenomena cannot be explained in terms of regularities or by virtue of any causal
account. Certainly, the normative facts sit, as it were, on the natural facts—one of
the difficulties here is articulating this relationship (e.g. via supervenience)—but
they also add something ‘‘more’’, a distinctively normative content, which ‘‘cannot
be accounted for by the causal or dispositional explanations at hand, such as the
causal explanations of learning that account for the dispositions that produce
people’s expectations’’ (p. 10). These ‘‘special objects’’ include: ‘‘meanings,
binding laws, obligations, rules, and so forth’’ (p. 10).
One of the key characteristics of normativism that Turner points to is its tendency
to posit a privileged description of that which needs to be explained, with the effect
that the explanation too is privileged. In the case of law, for instance, what needs to
be explained—according to the normativist—is whether some rule is genuinely or
really law. Whether a rule has this status cannot be ascertained by any account of
the beliefs of persons, even ‘‘insiders’’ or participants (legal practitioners); rather,
there must be, for instance, a system or set of norms that dictate what is genuinely or
really law. First, then, some realm of statuses is posited—genuine or real laws—and
then, secondly, an explanatory scheme is posited—a system of norms, say—that the
normativist can make explicit and that, when she does so, will show how certain
rules attain precisely that status of genuine or real laws. Only this system of norms
accounts for the status of some norms as genuine or real norms—not any series or
set of beliefs of the practitioners. To attempt to focus on any series or set of beliefs,
would be to engage in a sociological rather than a normative study of the law, and
thus to ‘‘change the subject.’’
Notice some other features in the above argument. As soon as a realm of genuine
or real laws is posited, and thus said to be in need of explanation, so the system of
norms that dictates which rules are genuinely and really law becomes necessary—
given it functions to secure the existence of the description, the explanation’s
existence itself becomes secure. Notice, too, that the system of norms in question
need not have been articulated; indeed, it is typically argued that it is not. Instead,
the system is hidden and needs to be made explicit; it is what exists behind the
genuineness of laws, producing them as the result of inferences that can only be
justified within that system. It is only thanks to the normativists that the rest of us
are able to be enlightened and come to see this enormously complicated set of
ultimate or absolute norms that are the conditions of possibility for genuine or real
laws, meanings, obligations, and so forth.
It is easy enough to see how such a theory can be translated into a social theory:
social life, on this view, is established and maintained by this hidden structure
operating in the background, according to which actions are either correct or
incorrect, and it is this structure that regulates social interaction, securing its
stability and forging the relevant society’s identity. Persons who participate in such
a social order are taught it and come to internalise it, though they may not be aware
of it. This goes not only for ‘‘our’’ society, but also for other societies. Indeed, on
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some versions, all human beings share one underlying structure of, say, rationality,
and it is only as a result of these universal, a priori norms of rationality that any of
us are able to make any sense of anyone’s beliefs and actions. Sometimes, it is even
said that we are human only insofar as we participate in this community of rational
beings, i.e. insofar as we feel the force (sometimes referred to as ‘‘the normative
force’’) of these norms of rationality, which are always and already there, just
waiting to be unearthed and made explicit by the normativist (who is somehow able
to access what the rest of us cannot). Less universal forms of this same idea speak of
‘‘local normativity’’, with localised hidden structures (e.g. paradigms in science, or
distinct practices) existing behind the beliefs and actions of those said to be
members of such communities. Incidentally, this move from universal to local
normativity is, says Turner, what characterised the movement from Kantianism to
Neo-Kantianism—the debate between them being at the root of contemporary
discussions of normativity (p. 67; for a discussion, see also Beiser 2009).
It is useful to remind ourselves here of the scope of Turner’s attack. The scope is
illustrated well in the following list of ‘‘special and puzzling objects’’ that are
posited by normativists:
…self-authorising principles, rules, understood as tacit rules behind the
explicit rules we might invent or propose; mathematical objects, which are not
realised in the physical world; objective values; dictates without dictators, the
dictates of reason itself; performative utterances which have the property of
being able to create a norm, through the act of utterance of a special ritual
kind; the nonspatial space of reason; the constraining ideal structure of thought
experiments; intentions without intenders, except for supposed collectives,
which, despite being wholly analogical, have the power to create and warrant
norms; commitments that are unlike ordinary commitments in that they are
made without anyone knowing that they were made, in which the person
undertaking the commitments could not have understood them as commit-
ments when they made them, or perhaps even afterward. (p. 15)
Conceived of in this broad sense, the attack encompasses everything from Platonic
forms, passing through the Hegelian world spirit and Fregean concepts, to the
Kelsenian Grundnorm and Brandom’s score-keeping practices, right through to
modern-day discussions of rule-following (as presented, for instance, in Paul
Boghossian’s work).
To be viable, any attack of this scope must not only pick out general features of a
common argument, but also zoom in on specific cases. The central case, picked not
only because it is characteristic but also because it is particularly well developed
and also dramatic in terms of its main protagonist’s acknowledgement of ‘‘defeat’’,
is Kelsen’s account of legality. Kelsen’s case is useful, too, for it highlights one of
the central features of normativist arguments—their Achilles heel, if you like—
namely the problem of the infinite regress.
To get a grip on what Kelsen was grappling with, it is best to cite his own words:
When the validity of one norm founds the validity of another norm in one
way or another, this creates the relation between a higher and a lower norm.
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A norm stands to another norm as higher to lower, if the validity of the latter is
founded on the validity of the former. If the validity of the lower norm is
grounded on the validity of the higher norm in that the lower norm is created
in the way prescribed in the higher norm, then the higher norm has the
character of a constitution with respect to the lower norm, since the essence of
a constitution is that it regulates the creation of norms. (Kelsen, quoted at
p. 75; original emphasis)
The problem here is the rather obvious one: where does the hierarchy of validity
end? It is one thing to say, as Kelsen does, that one legal norm’s validity can only be
inferred from another: for Kelsen, only another valid norm can justify the existence
of a further valid norm. But it is another thing to account for how it is that this series
of justifications ends, such that—and this is obviously crucial—that it itself is valid
(for only then, on Kelsen’s view, would it be capable of beginning the series of
validity, thereby ultimately establishing a legal system). Here is where, famously or
perhaps infamously, Kelsen posited a Grundnorm (or a Basic Norm). But the
positing of this ‘‘regress-stopper’’ was not so much a solution, as an itch that kept
troubling Kelsen for the rest of his life. For what to say about this Grundnorm? If it
is valid, where does it get its validity from?
Turner expertly traces the history of Kelsen’s wrestle with the Grundnorm. The
punchline—though not a funny one—is that Kelsen ultimately argued that the
Grundnorm was not really a norm, but rather a fiction—‘‘a cognitive device used
when one is unable to attain one’s cognitive goal with the material at hand’’ (Kelsen,
quoted at p. 89). Furthermore, it is a fiction that is ‘‘accompanied—or ought to be
accompanied—by the awareness that reality does not agree with it’’ (Kelsen, quoted
at p. 89). As Turner points out, ‘‘Kelsen recognised that without accepting some sort
of mystical general will, which was inherently self-authorising and referred to no
higher authority, there was no way of generating legal normativity’’ (p. 89).
Those unfamiliar, or uninterested, in legal philosophy may wonder whether
Kelsen’s difficulties are unique to the law. According to Turner, nothing could be
further from the truth. The same difficulties beset accounts of social normativity (as
in Winch) or linguistic normativity (as in Brandom). For instance, according to
Turner, and like Kelsen, whereas Winch relies, in his first discussion of the Azande
in The Idea of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1958) on the notion of
internal relations (among Azande beliefs), he ends up, in the later ‘‘Understanding a
Primitive Society’’ (1964), not using the term, saying instead that ‘‘the forms in
which human rationality expresses itself in the culture of a human society cannot be
elucidated simply in terms of the logical coherence of rules according to which
activities are carried out’’ (Winch, quoted at p. 108; original emphasis). The
problem here was that the only translations available of Azande beliefs showed
them (if one applied the internal relations reading) to be contradictory. In order to
avoid this conclusion, and not wishing to question the translations, Winch
eventually ‘‘confessed’’ (Turner’s term) that it must be ‘‘our intellectual habits’’
that press ‘‘Zande thought where it would not naturally go’’ (Winch, quoted at
p. 107–108). It is we, said Winch, who were ‘‘guilty of misunderstanding, not the
Zande’’ (Winch, quoted at p. 108). There is, in fact, another reading of this
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episode—not one that points to, as Turner does in his reading of it, to the
inescapability and priority of the natural, but to precisely the lessons Winch took
from the encounter, when he reflected further upon it, i.e. his willingness to
acknowledge the limitations of his way of making sense of other cultures (indeed,
this reading is illustrative of the humanist pragmatism elaborated on in part three).
The important point, for present purposes, is to see that the moves Turner identifies
in Kelsen are not peculiar to legal philosophy, but affect social philosophy also (to
repeat, Winch’s internal relations are like Kelsen’s Grundorm; both are chimeras).
Earlier, in discussing Kelsen, I mentioned that Turner pointed out that Kelsen
recognised that in the absence of positing a mystical general will, there was no way
of generating legal normativity (based purely and exclusively on normative
phenomena). Others have not been so reluctant to posit such general wills. A
discussion and critique of these contributions—under the guise of ‘‘collective
intentionality’’ (another popular and arguably growing domain of social theory)—is
undertaken by Turner in his fifth chapter (this is also the only chapter that has
appeared before: Turner 2003). The culprit here is Sellars, who has grown in
influence in the last few decades, primarily as a result of the efforts of Brandom and
McDowell (both, for instance, are contributors to a recent collection of papers on
Sellars; see deVries 2010). Turner neatly traces Sellars’s ideas to their Durkhei-
menian source (see p. 123), but it is not the biographical argument that is of most
interest.
A large part of Sellars’s appeal to contemporary analytical philosophers was his
masterly analysis of ordinary language. Turner, it seems, is immune to his charms.
On Turner’s reconstruction, Sellars argued that there must be collective intentions
because otherwise we could not make sense of such statements as ‘‘we disapprove of
women smoking, but I don’t’’ (Sellars, quoted at p. 124). If there was no such thing—
no such fact—as collective intention, then this would just be a contradiction, for the
speaker’s ‘‘I’’ would be included in the ‘‘we’’ (the ‘‘we’’ on this reading being simply
a list of individual’s ‘‘I’’ that happen to share the same attitude). However, if we
acknowledge collective intentions as facts, then there is no contradiction, for the
speaker’s intention is one fact, and the collective intention of the ‘‘we’’ is another. A
deep problem—indeed, this is the crux of Turner’s critique—is how to establish that
this fact, if it is a fact, is shared (Turner argues that this cannot be established, or that
attempts to establish it are mysterious). What is important, for present purposes, is to
see that part of the normativist strategy can be, and often is, to posit such collective
intentions as facts, precisely in order to generate normativity (in the absence of, say, a
Grundnorm or any other such absolute or ultimate norm). For, on these accounts,
such collective intentions generate, for instance, ‘‘joint commitments’’, whether
these be joint commitments to walk together (as in Margaret Gilbert’s famous
example, see Gilbert 1990), or joint commitments to certain norms (such as the norm
of truth for belief, see, e.g. Shah 2003) that are said, then, to be inescapable—at least
for those who are members of the communities that issue such joint commitments on
the back of such collective intentions (what, if anything, determines membership is
one of the familiar problems here).
We have reached that word again: inescapability. One of the recurring features of
normativism, as portrayed by Turner, is the normativist’s reply to any purported
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explanation of normative facts, e.g. via the ‘‘beliefs’’ of participants. The reply is
articulated well by Turner (throughout, Turner tries to take on the voice of the
normativist, and then reply to it—this is a welcome stylistic feature of the book):
Throughout this treatment of normativism, the discussion of the ‘‘social
science’’ approach has violated the basic rules of the game of argument. The
use of notions like ‘‘belief’’ is a signal and example of this violation. The term
cannot be used meaningfully apart from the terms that connect to it (and
connect in a normative, justificatory, way). With such terms, along with
intention, meaning, concepts, and so forth, one is in for a penny, in for a
pound. There is no taking this and that – helping oneself – from the package of
related concepts. The main thing that the concept of belief requires is the most
transparently normative philosophical concept of all: rationality. One cannot
attribute beliefs on the basis of utterances, or even treat the utterances as
meaningful, without assuming rationality on the part of the speaker. And this
means assuming intentionality, concept-possession, ‘‘concepts’’ in the norma-
tive sense and all the rest of it… What is important is recognising the
inescapability of these concepts, and accepting it (pp. 151–152).
Turner has a reply to this reply, but for it, and for other criticisms of normativism, as
sketched above, we must turn to the next part of this essay.
Before doing so, I must make one more disclaimer. I have tried as much as
possible, in the above, not to challenge Turner’s characterisation of the normativism
that he targets. There are some normativists who would be happy to be characterised
in the way Turner characterises normativism, and among them are those who have
made and continue to make strenuous efforts to render less mysterious that which is
posited both in the allegedly privileged descriptions and in the allegedly privileged
explanations of normative objects. To discuss them—such as, for instance,
Wedgewood’s recent The Nature of Normativity (2007)—would lengthen this essay
beyond propriety. It is, however, a pity that Wedgewood’s attempt, and other such
attempts, were not discussed by Turner.
But the matter of characterisation does not go away so easily. I mentioned, in the
introduction, that it is interesting that Turner chooses Kelsen, rather than Hart, as the
‘‘paradigm normativist’’, nevertheless acknowledging that Hart was a ‘‘normativist
of sorts.’’ What ‘‘sort’’, we might ask? As Turner surely knows, given his citation of
Lacey’s The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (2004), Hart was an avid reader of
Weber and based his argument for an ‘‘internal point of view’’ on Weber (though,
interestingly, without acknowledging him; see Hart 1961). The contemporary
debate over legal normativity, at least in the Anglo-American world, focuses much
more on Hart’s concept of legal normativity than Kelsen’s. Some read it in a way
that is friendlier to naturalism than others (see, e.g. Smith 2006, Marmor 2009,
Delacroix 2006, Bertea 2009), but either way, Turner’s choice of Kelsen, and thus
his characterisation of normativism, renders it somewhat off-key in terms of
contemporary debates, at least in the legal context.
Also missing from his portrait of normativism is the concept of freedom (the term
does not even appear in the index). This is somewhat astonishing, given some of the
theorists Turner cites, e.g. Peter Railton, who in an important paper referenced by
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Turner (Railton 1999), makes his entire conception of normativity rest on the
balance between normative force and normative freedom. Finally, there is but a
nod—principally through Christine Korsgaard (1996) and Joseph Raz (1999)—to
the study of normativity via practical reason. Certainly, there is discussion (and
dismissal) of the viability of Reason with a capital R, but there is a great deal of
work here, e.g. most recently by Derek Parfit (the manuscript, originally called
Climbing the Mountain, is forthcoming, but has been circulating for years amongst
philosophers). It is not that Turner’s criticisms would not apply to some of these
theorists—Parfit, for instance, frustratingly asserts that ‘‘we cannot explain what
normativity is, or what normative concepts mean’’ (Parfit 2006, p. 331), which
Turner would rightly criticise for mystery-mongering—but it is difficult to evaluate
Turner’s attack when he does not take into account the detailed proposals made on
behalf of practical reason. This is especially so when you consider some of the
claims made in this context, for instance, the claim by Parfit that ‘‘the
disagreement’’ in the literature on normativity ‘‘is not about what the word
normative means but about what practical reasoning, at its best, either does or could
involve (p. 372; for a recent collection analysing normativity via practical reason
see Robertson 2009).
Anti-Normativism
I have already mentioned Turner’s complaint that the objects posited by
normativists are queer and mysterious; that they trade in mysteries and ask the
rest of us to simply ‘‘learn to live with it’’ (this statement, made by Boghossian
1989, is repeated four times in the book, at pp. 12, 14, 30, and 194, as if Turner
could not believe anyone could make such a claim).2 I have also already hinted at a
number of other criticisms, such as the positing of a privileged level of description
that then calls for a privileged level of explanation. But I want to focus here on
another kind of criticism, a form of demystification, introduced by Turner, which
also gives us a flavour of the general tenor of Turner’s treatment of normativist
theories and their objects.
The criticism/demystification in question is what Turner refers to as the ‘‘Good
Bad Theory’’ explanation. The concept of Good Bad Theories is first introduced in
chapter two, where Turner surveys a series of scientific and social scientific
explanations of the normative. After recounting the history and cultural particularity
of notions such as truth and even, to some extent, intention (Turner says that
‘‘something like intention is perhaps universal’’, p. 42), Turner says the following
(about such and other notions like them):
2 Expressions of frustration, even within the ranks of normativists, about what Turner refers to as
mystery-mongering are by no means rare. Indeed, the term ‘‘mysterionism’’ has been coined to
characterise just such a position. Attacks on it, and other forms of normativism that refuse to carry the
explanatory burden (e.g. various forms of ‘‘quietism’’), are arguably growing in number, e.g. see
McPherson 2010.
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All of the diverse folk notions mentioned here…have two relevant features:
they are taken for granted, believed in, accepted, subscribed to, or used, by
people in particular, different, social settings. They work in those social
settings to enable the participants to interact with each other, understand each
other, and co-ordinate their conduct. None of them is ‘‘true’’ in the sense of
being scientifically true. (p. 42)
Up until the last sentence, Turner’s explanation is an attractive one. It recognises the
pragmatic life of certain notions in certain communities; it acknowledges the hold
these tend to have on how persons reflect, judge and interact with others. But then
comes the last sentence: we are told that these folk notions—these ways of coping—
are not ‘‘true’’ and further ‘‘not true in sense of being scientifically true’’. This is
what Turner means when he says these are ‘‘Good Bad Theories’’. The ‘‘good’’ part
is that they are ‘‘good theories for a particular, unspecified set of purposes in a
particular setting’’ (p. 43). The ‘‘bad’’ part is that they are ‘‘inadequate explanations
of anything’’ (p. 43), and, as noted above, that they are not ‘‘scientifically true’’.
I shall look, in a moment, at the applications of this idea to two phenomena—
first, to lustral rites in chapter four, and then to group concepts in chapter five—but
the following general point can be made presently: is the second sentence, or the
‘‘bad’’ part, really necessary to assert? Is not Turner here doing precisely what he
accuses the normativists of doing: claiming priority and inescapability? Recall that
for the normativist, on Turner’s characterisation, scientific or social scientific
explanations are parasitic on normative phenomena; any scientific explanation will,
thus, not be normatively true (or it will change the subject, etc.). But is not Turner
mirroring the same move by buying into the metaphysical talk? By saying that these
folk notions are not really there, not real or genuine scientific facts, Turner is
effectively adopting the same meta-theoretical stance as the normativists he
criticises. For humanist pragmatism, which is elaborated upon in the third part of
this essay, the first feature (the ‘‘good’’ part) is all we need.
Very briefly, then, let us look at these two applications of Turner’s Good Bad
Theory explanation. In the fourth chapter, Turner takes issue with Winch’s criticism
of Vilfredo Pareto’s (1935) characterisation of baptisms as lustral rites. Pareto had
argued the following:
Christians have the custom of baptism. If one knows the Christian procedure
only one would not know whether and how it could be analysed. Moreover we
have an explanation of it; we are told that the rite of baptism is celebrated to
remove original sin. That still is not enough. If we had no other facts of the
same class to go by, we should find it difficult to isolate the elements in the
complex phenomenon of baptism. But we do have facts of that type. The
pagans too had lustral water, and they used it for purposes of purification
(p. 101).
Pareto goes on to find a ‘‘rational kernel to this idea’’, namely that ‘‘the human being
as a rule has a vague feeling that water somehow cleanses moral as well as material
pollution’’ (p. 101), but accepting this explanation as a participant would, according
to Pareto, be ‘‘far too simple’’, hence the ‘‘looking for something more complicated,
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more pretentious’’ (Pareto, quoted at p. 101). Turner calls this a ‘‘model bit of
naturalism’’ (p. 101). He then elaborates on it himself, adding that the Christian
theory of baptism (the explanation internal, as it were, to the Christian practice) is
‘‘a complicated but bogus theory—what I have been calling here a Good Bad
Theory’’ (p. 101).
Now Turner does have a point here about Winch’s criticism of Pareto, which
turned on the idea that since ‘‘actions are logically connected to intentions…to be an
act, rather than a bit of behaviour…it must be the act intended’’, such that in this
case ‘‘the baptising priest intended to baptise…he did not intend to perform a lustral
rite’’ (p. 101). This has the effect of excluding an explanation of the act in question
as a lustral rite, on the grounds that it allegedly misdescribes the meaning of the
action for the participants. Insofar as the lustral rite explanation is excluded, and
insofar as the normativist claims priority, this is indeed problematic, and Turner is
right to point this out.
But the same can be said for Turner’s (and Pareto’s) position: it excludes the
normativist explanation; indeed, it does more: it ridicules it in very patronising
terms. Turner goes on to say that ‘‘in our time, we are typically uncomfortable
with…the idea that the Christian version of Holy Baptism actually makes any
sense’’, and that ‘‘accepting this language hardly seems to be the sort of thing that
anyone should be told is a condition for any project of explanation or
understanding’’ (p. 102). This talk does not sit well with what Turner himself
later says about the attractiveness of Weber’s approach to these issues: the meaning
for the participants was important to take into account; one could explain that
meaning in terms of the beliefs of the participants, and how those beliefs and their
correlated actions helped participants to achieve certain aims, but no such
explanation either required the social scientist to ‘‘accept’’ any language (in the
sense of endorsing it, or reifying it) or gave an opportunity to ridicule it. The point
here, once again, is that talk of existence, of something really and genuinely being
true or real, can be relied on by anyone—whether this be normativism or naturalism,
in its more extreme versions—to exclude other explanations, which are better seen
as ways of coping and thus, with their own inevitable limitations but also uses. Put
differently, the general point is that nobody has a monopoly on talk of existence,
truth and reality, and where they think they do, this all too easily leads to the often
dismissive and thoughtless exclusion of the views of others. This is not to say there
cannot be room for disagreement and evaluation; but it is to say that such
disagreement and evaluation can be engaged in without attempting to stand on
higher ground by, for instance, claiming metaphysical superiority and priority.
The same difficulties bedevil Turner’s attempted demystification of group
concepts (in chapter five). Again, Turner makes the point that concepts such as that
of a nation or a race ‘‘are objects by virtue of the beliefs that surround them’’
(p. 136). Further, they ‘‘serve the purposes of social coordination, of making sense
of social experience, justifying authority, justifying claims to speak for others’’
(p. 137). This is all well and good. However, Turner then goes on to say: ‘‘but this
does not mean that they are anything but extended metaphors, or that they warrant a
general analysis. Nor does it make sense to treat them as true. The idea of a group is
not a natural one, but is rather constructed, ideological, and often mythical; group
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concepts are perfect instances of Good Bad Theories’’ (p. 137). Perhaps troubled by
the possibility that he may be going too far, he then says, ‘‘this is not to say that
these theories are not Good Bad Theories about something’’ (p. 137; original
emphasis)—a mysterious statement if ever there was one. The question here is why
Turner feels compelled to go the extra mile and assert that ‘‘it does not make sense
to treat’’ these concepts ‘‘as true’’. Why enter at all into ‘‘truth’’ talk or ‘‘existence’’
talk—if not to claim priority or inescapability?
The problem for Turner is that he contradicts himself. When attacking the
normativist, he says that ‘‘if the normative model is only a hypothesis, the playing
field is levelled. There is no privileged description that necessitates the truth of the
normative model’’ (p. 112). This we can accept, but then does not the same go for
the naturalist model, namely, that it is a hypothesis, and not anything that has a
monopoly on what is true and real? That Turner appears to think that science has
that monopoly is also visible in his claims that the very ‘‘normative-natural
distinction…is a normative distinction, depending on the definition of norms, or the
normative theory, that supplies the normative elements that are supposed to be
separated out and used to reconstruct the phenomenon free from naturalistic or
causal considerations’’ (p. 148). But this exclusion of naturalism is hardly a
necessary part of the distinction; again, the distinction could be made on purely
pragmatic grounds; both are hypotheses that serve different purposes, both are
different ways of coping. In fact, Turner uses this argument to exclude the
normativists and their intuitions: he says, the distinction ‘‘is not an explanatory
distinction found in nature or social reality’’ (p. 148). This is puzzling: it pushes the
normativists and their intuitions out of ‘‘nature or social reality’’, which is hardly
‘‘levelling the playing field.’’ A normativist need not be an anti-naturalist; the
normativist need not claim, as Turner has her claim, that ‘‘only the normative
exists’’ (p. 153); here, Turner is embedding into normativist a meta-theoretical
attitude that he himself seems to express on behalf of naturalism. This is not to say
that there are not some forms of normativism that make the claim that Turner
ascribes to them, i.e. they claim superiority and priority over the natural; the point is
that there are other forms of normativism that need not make such a claim. As we
shall see later, in part three, these are forms that tend to adopt a highly pragmatic
attitude to norms, e.g. they do not think of normativity as a domain of explicitly or
implicitly existing norms that dictate what is correct and incorrect, but, instead,
think of norms as contingent, fragile resources in a space in which evaluations are
made. Normativity, on these views, is not exhausted by norms and their mode of
existence, but is broadened out to something like ‘assessability’, i.e. a necessarily
pragmatic space for evaluative feelings and the making of evaluations that may or
may not be informed by certain norms.
I have already mentioned that the tone in some of Turner’s criticisms is
disparaging. It is one thing to use fighting words to warn against excessive
generalisations on behalf of some philosophical position; it is another to call, for
instance, the belief that ‘‘the persons in a tribe descended from people who emerged
from the earth at some particular hill at some specific moment in history, that they
descend from people who had a covenant with God’’ ‘‘literally false and…absurd’’
(p. 146).
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I have barely scratched the surface here in terms of Turner’s criticism of his
characterisation of normativism. Many of these criticisms are, in this reader’s
opinion, spot on. For instance, insofar as we associate normativism with ‘‘the idea of
a set of inferences organised into a system’’ (p. 110) that exists, hidden, in the
background, and is furthermore universal, such that all persons have always and will
always share some ‘‘deeper set of concepts’’ (p. 113, a view attributed to
McDowell)—these are overblown claims and by no means are they necessary parts
of a normativist explanation. Further, they are ideas that, as Turner argues, can be
used, and have been used, in an exclusionary fashion—outlawing certain beliefs and
practices (see pp. 142–143).3 These, and other such, criticisms will have to be
addressed by those normativists who have upheld them and who wish to continue
doing so. But the aptness of these criticisms ought not to make us think that the
features Turner has identified are necessary elements of normativism.
Towards Humanist Pragmatism?
I have already noted some of my qualms with Turner’s tone. Turner certainly seems
to slip, at least occasionally, into an aggressive and dismissive form of naturalism—
scientism, we might call it—that parallels the kinds of claims to priority and
inescapability in the forms of normativism (let us call them fundamentalism) that he
so aptly and ardently attacks. But the same cannot be said for all of the aspects of
Turner’s positive picture. These more modest aspects emerge most clearly in
Turner’s discussion of Donald Davidson (in chapter six), and in his endorsement of
something like a reconstructed Davidson-Weber picture of normativity, together
with some additions of his own. Given space restrictions, I cannot do justice to
Turner’s analysis here4; let me make just some brief points.
The thrust of Turner’s reading of Davidson is that we ought to conceive of certain
norms of rationality—what are referred to as the ‘‘enthymematic elements’’
involved in interpreting others (such as norms of consistency, coherence and
correspondence discussed by Davidson)—not as universal, inescapable, true etc.
norms that are always and already there and that necessarily govern or regulate our
interactions, but rather as defeasible, fragile, revisable ways of making others
intelligible. Hypothetical intelligibility, rather than rule-based correctness or some
form of tacit objectivity, is the key. Interpreting someone as if they were consistent
and coherent, for instance, is the ‘‘counsel of interpretive charity’’ (p. 159), not some
kind of McDowell-like necessary or conceptual conditions for understanding others
or some Brandom-like ‘‘normative rule-book governing the scoring system
underlying linguistic practice’’ (pp. 159–160). These norms are better conceived,
then, as Weber-like ‘‘ideal–typical forms of decision-making’’ that help us to make
3 In this respect, Turner aptly reminds us of Kant being disciplined for ‘‘theological disputation under the
guise of philosophy’’, as when he argued on the basis of his philosophy against ‘‘certain religious
doctrines of which he disapproved’’: p. 143; see Hunter 2005 for details.
4 Turner refers to a forthcoming paper, not yet available, that further elaborates on his notion of
‘‘following the thought of another.’’
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others intelligible and are also our only way in which we identify ‘‘biases of actual
decision-making’’ (p. 160).
In this way, Davidson and Weber are reconciled. ‘‘Davidson’s problem,’’ says
Turner, ‘‘like Weber’s, involves the problem of intelligibility, not the problem of
supposedly binding norms’’ (p. 161). To the extent that there is error, this error ‘‘is
not deviation from rules, and there is no constraint here, no disciplining by group
reactions, as in Brandom’’ (p. 161).5 Instead, there is ‘‘the problem of making
oneself understood to other individuals and of understanding other individuals’’
(p. 161). ‘‘Success’’, not some absolute correctness (or some ultimate authority to
assert what is correct and what is not), is what matters. Interpreting others, then, is a
‘‘hypothesis-testing epistemic process, in which we employ what we know about
ourselves and our beliefs to construct accounts of others’ beliefs that make sense of
their behaviour’’ (p. 162).
This approach also answers the normativist objection I referred to in part one of
this essay, namely that the naturalist helps himself to terms that are normative
through and through. Recall that the central concept here was ‘‘rationality’’—the
one that we allegedly fall back on in the end as, for instance, in our talk of ‘‘beliefs’’
of participants. Here is Turner’s answer:
Rationality is normative, but not in McDowell’s sense. It is not the rationality
of constraint. Our only constraint is the limit of our capacity to make
intelligible. There is no gap between what we can recognise as intentional and
meaningful and what we can make intelligible – that is to say, what we can
follow, which includes intelligible error. Justification has no special status
of the kind accorded to it by Brandom. It is just another piece of behaviour.
(p. 165)
Notice the presence of the phrase ‘‘what we can follow’’ in the above. This is a
central plank of Turner’s own positive contribution. It is set up by the above
reconstruction and endorsement of the Davidsonian-Weberian approach to norm-
ativity. But it itself also includes its own characteristics. The capacity to follow the
thought of another (this is how Turner phrases it) is, in essence, an empathic ability:
Empathy, in the sense of following the thought of another, explains what is
necessary to explain. Empathy is important as an addition to this discussion
because it goes beyond the traditional Humean inputs and means of learning.
To the extent that we have, and actually employ in ordinary interaction, a
primitive capacity for following the thought of another – ‘‘primitive’’ meaning
that we can do this ‘‘following’’ the thought of another without constructing a
theory or invoking presuppositions – we have a surrogate for the kinds of
a priori content that Kant thought Hume was lacking, a surrogate without the
mysteries of transcendental philosophy. (p. 204)
Learning certainly is vital. It is a causal process, and may involve learning the kinds
of folk notions that we saw Turner recognise have effects (pp. 143–147; but that, to
5 Here, Turner cites and endorses a great paper by Paul Roth (2003), which criticises, inter alia, the idea
that our judgement of mistakes is necessarily based on our application of pre-existing rules.
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recall, he went on to disparage as ‘‘literally false and absurd’’). At bottom, however,
is this primitive capacity to empathise. Human beings, says, Turner ‘‘have a very
powerful capacity for emulation, mirroring, and therefore empathy’’ (p. 137)—as
many accounts in social neuroscience have shown in recent years. That Turner relies
heavily on this research is evident when he says that the notion of following the
thought of another ‘‘is perhaps best understood in terms of the idea of simulation in
cognitive science. And it is this idea’’, he adds, ‘‘that suffices to account for our
capacity to make sense of others, to account for intelligibility as distinct from beliefs
about rightness’’ (p. 168).
Empathy is further supplemented by feedback. In interacting with someone, and
thus following their thought, we get ‘‘feedback from our interactions that reassures
us that we are following them sufficiently to say we understand them’’ (p. 168);
there is a constant adjustment and re-adjustment ‘‘in the course of interaction’’
(p. 168). Turner says, somewhat mysteriously, that ‘‘the process of feedback cannot
be easily reduced to a mechanism’’ (p. 42), but neither is it a ‘‘collective fact that is
external and constraining’’ (p. 168). I agree with him that something like feedback is
necessary to build into the picture, but it is unclear, from his few remarks, just what
he means by it. Certainly, feedback is necessary first and foremost to ensure that we
are speaking of interaction, rather than simply one-way traffic of interpretation or
intelligibility. Without feedback, the account risks being solipsistic: there is this
process we engage in where we use hypotheses, based on knowledge of ourselves, to
make others intelligible, but there is no hint as to how the interpreter can revise her
own ways of making intelligible. Surely, Turner would not want us to think that
when we interact with another, all we ever see are versions of ourselves? This would
speak against the viability of the notion of empathy.6
The matter is complicated by yet another addition to the picture: the notion of
Evidenz—a notion popularised in modern philosophy by Franz Brentano and hailing
back to the Cartesian notion of self-evidence (p. 170). According to Brentano,
Evidenz is a judgement about what ‘‘anyone whose judgement were evident would
judge’’ (quoted at p. 172); ‘‘in short’’, says Turner, ‘‘it is a claim about what others
would think—an empathic claim’’ (p. 173). Evidenz, it seems, for Turner, is a kind
of ‘‘direct understanding’’ that is ‘‘non-inferential and ungroundable’’ (p. 175), but
this kind of understanding is not understanding of intentions or meanings or norms,
or the like, but rather ‘‘behavioural data.’’ For example, in observing a woodcutter
cutting wood, we do not see the ‘‘intentions’’ of the woodcutter; we just see the
woodcutter cutting wood directly and non-inferentially, without needing to ‘‘employ
the language of intention’’ (which Turner classifies as ‘‘a Good Bad Theory of
mind’’) (p. 175). ‘‘We ‘‘know’’ or ‘‘assume’’ the man is chopping wood because we
6 In fact, this raises the interesting question—which unfortunately I can only mention here—as to what
exactly Turner means by empathy. For instance, Turner does not discuss the difference between empathy
and sympathy. As Jesse Prinz points out, the difference is that in empathy we are obliged to share the
feelings of who we observe/interpret/interact with; in sympathy, we sympathise with the feelings of the
other without sharing them (as when a parent sympathises with a child who feels scared in the dark, but
does not feel the fear themselves): see Prinz 2007, pp. 82–83. Is it empathy or sympathy, then, that Turner
has in mind? Given what he says about making others intelligible on the basis of what we know about
ourselves, it seems that it is sympathy—but then empathy is a badly chosen term.
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can rely, to some extent, on the default setting of empathic projection’’ (p. 177). We
see the man’s actions ‘‘as meaningful’’ (p. 175); we recognise it as a gesture ‘‘about
something’’ (p. 177); but only as a result of an empathic projection (p. 177), and not,
for instance, on the basis of some background normative facts that we have
internalised or are committed to. There is nothing more to unearth here in terms of
normative facts. We simply observe, and together with feedback we get ‘‘as much
‘‘objectivity’’ in this case as there is to be had’’ (p. 178). Further, it follows that what
is empathic is ‘‘final in the sense that there is no further explanation of it’’ (p. 179).
There is some promise in these suggestions, but at this stage, evaluation must be
withheld, for they really are too under-developed to allow for a proper assessment. It
is difficult, for instance, to evaluate claims concerning ‘‘direct, non-inferential and
ungroundable understanding’’ without further elaboration on what this might be
(one possibility is something like Shaun Gallagher’s 2008 account of direct
perception in the intersubjective context). More fundamentally, though, and again
on the notion of Evidenz, why does Turner think it necessary for persons, in order to
interact, to actually agree on where justifications or regresses end? That he believes
this can be seen in his claim that ‘‘regresses…end at the point that people find that
they can follow each other, and that the step in their reasoning is evident. Evidenz—
that is, ending a regress at a point that the parties each find their way to—is
indispensable’’ (p. 182). This begins to sound eerily like some of the normativist
claims Turner attacked earlier in the book, such as those that claim that the sharing
of a framework (e.g. of knowledge of norms, even if that knowledge is tacit) is
necessary for social interaction. Turner tries to beat off such potential criticisms by
saying that he is not talking about something ‘‘being evident’’, but rather about it
‘‘seeming evident’’, or that the two (being and seeming) are ‘‘the same thing’’; he
also says that though being ‘‘similarly situated’’ is necessary for Evidenz, this is not
the same as ‘‘sharing a framework’’ (p. 183)—but this feels rushed, and more like a
convenient philosophical escape route than an argument or an explanation. Again, to
repeat the question: why think that in order to get along, to interact, or for social life
to flourish, we need to agree on the same thing, or converge on the same
understanding, or even feel that it seems that some thing is beyond doubt? Surely we
muddle through in a much more heterogonous fashion than that?
These questions concerning Evidenz are connected to the little we get by way of
an elaboration of how feedback works. To what extent does it make room for the
self-transformation of the interpreter? Is even this language—of interpreter and
object of interpretation—appropriate for contexts of interaction? Should the
concepts here not be more dialogical, less monological?
The difficulties of how to conceive of the normative dimension of social
interaction are connected, in the end, to the meta-theoretical attitudes we employ in
constructing our theories. These, in turn, are connected to how we relate to others;
how we live, or who we express ourselves to be in our relations with others. In his
Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences, Paul Roth noted that ‘‘there are
important connections, and connections previously unappreciated, between what is
to count as rational and how to live one’s life’’ (Roth 1987, p. 113). This is a
profound statement that demands further reflection, and of course, in going on to say
what I do I do not claim to be representing Roth’s thought (though it is telling that
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Roth too ended up defending explanatory pluralism in the social sciences based, to a
large extent, on a reconstruction of W.V.O. Quine’s pragmatism).
Perhaps we can put matters this way: when considering the normativity versus
naturalism debate, I can adopt one side, try to give it the most powerful expression I
can muster, defend it against objections, and seek to defeat the other side. This
would involve me seeing the other side’s intuitions and arguments based on what I
understand and what I am attracted to; what seems reasonable and intelligible to me.
The interaction in question would then only go so far as a one-way assessment of
what I think makes sense—even if I acknowledge that there is no last word, as it
were, just my best guess. There is, however, another possibility, more dialogical in
tone, which involves trying to see how both positions might need to be tamed,
warned against over-generalising or over-blowing their intuitions, and thus how
some middle path might be cleared for fruitful dialogues to take place. What would
such a dialogue be like? It would be one where, once you begin it, you do not know
where you will end up after it; one in which you leave room for changing what you
have found intelligible in the past; one in which you and your ways of coping are
capable of being transformed. Of course, this middle path need not be—indeed, it
should not be presented to be—a path in which everyone must find the same thing
evident, or must see what is allegedly there to be seen, and thus one that leads to
some reunification of one big happy family, whose members live happily ever after.
No, it can lead to much debate and disagreement, based, for instance, on the
purposes for which one wants to use a certain constellation of normativist and
naturalist intuitions (the Davidsonian-Weberian approach, as reconstructed by
Turner, is an excellent example of one such constellation). In other words, the
middle path is a path that establishes continuity (rather than a rift) between those
who disagree, while nevertheless allowing for a pluralism of explanations that differ
based on the needs they meet, or the aims they contribute to. This is the kind of
picture I am proposing to call humanist pragmatism.
Transpose this, now, to a picture of the normative dimension of social
interaction. We can see this dimension as one that requires persons to share, and be
committed to, some common normative knowledge, e.g. knowledge about rules or
norms, or other kinds of standards, that dictate what is correct and incorrect. On
this account, we go about evaluating each other as doing appropriate or
inappropriate things, and we keep score, trusting or distrusting the person in
question in the future. Or, we could see this dimension as one in which we coalesce
around ‘‘what everyone similarly situated would find evident’’ and find unintel-
ligible anyone who does not. These ways of seeing it are themselves ways of
coping, which no doubt serve certain purposes, but neither of them would really
capture the humanist pragmatist spirit sketched above. A humanist pragmatist
would feel uncomfortable with either account, for they would not express what she
herself espouses at the meta-theoretical level. Perhaps, then, and as hinted in part
two above, this humanist pragmatist would conceive of that normative dimension
in terms of assessability; this would not be a space where what is correct or
incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate, is always and already there, as it were, just
waiting to be revealed and applied properly. Rather, it would be a space in which
persons interact, making assessments but without needing to assign them a status of
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finality; a space in which the meta-evaluation of first-order assessments is always
possible (there is no problem of infinite regress here, for the decision to go to the
next level is a pragmatic one). Certainly, in the swim of daily life it is impossible
to go around negotiating how things are to be evaluated; we need something, even
provisional, to hold on to that facilitates co-ordination in a quick and economic
fashion. The point is that when this space is opened up, we make assessments, but
not by reference to anything that ‘‘does not have any further explanation’’, that is
‘‘primitive’’, ‘‘genuinely real’’ or ‘‘really true’’, and so on, but just something that
we have gotten used to using as a way of coping (as noted above, this includes our
philosophical or social scientific theories). The things we hold onto, then, are
revisable ways of coping, habitual ways of relating to others, some of which we
learn from our family and friends, some from further abroad (and, indeed, we learn
some of them through our incredible capacity to simulate others). We interact not
because or insofar as we make each other intelligible on our own terms, but
because or insofar as we are able and willing to be transformed by the encounter
with the other, becoming increasingly aware of the inevitable limitations of our
ways of coping (this recalls the alternative reading, mentioned above, of Winch’s
turn-around, in 1964, on his previous treatment of the Azande). This is but a
sketch, of course—but it gives some flavour as to what a humanist pragmatism, at
the meta-theoretical level, might say, at the first order level, about the normative
dimension of social interaction. It is a picture that includes normativist elements,
but by no means in an anti-naturalist tone: it strives for a constellation between
these intuitions.
I mentioned earlier that aspects of Turner’s positive contribution nudge us
towards humanist pragmatism. We have seen, in this part of the essay, that Turner
does end up making room for the normative, though in a way that is softer, more
modest than the forms of normativism he criticises. We have also seen, in part two
of this essay, how on occasion Turner’s criticism lapses into an immodest form of
naturalism (which I have called scientism), one that claims priority for scientific
explanations. Although Turner does not explicitly discuss modest or immodest
versions of naturalism, his willingness to nevertheless include a softer form of
normativity, of the Davidsonian-Weberian kind, into his account, suggests that
modesty is possible—and on both sides (for other more recent efforts to articulate a
softer form of naturalism, see De Caro and MacArthur 2004, 2010). For this reader’s
money, the reconstruction of Davidson, and the use made of Weber, are indicative
of a rapprochement between two sides that otherwise find it difficult to talk to each
other. We need to hear more from Turner as to his ‘‘empathy plus feedback and
Evidenz’’ as to whether this is the most promising way to further elaborate that
rapprochement. What is most significant is that, at his best, Turner opens the door
for a much friendlier and more fruitful future debate.
Conclusion
There is one elephant in the room that I have yet to mention in this essay: the
practice of explanation itself. Surprisingly, in a book entitled Explaining the
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Normative, and one in which so much emphasis is placed on explanatory value, very
little is said about explanation. But there is another question that we can raise about
the identification of science or social science with explanation, and the elevation of
explanation to a superior tribunal. In an unjustly neglected book, Explanation in
Social Science (1963), Brown noted that ‘‘most work in the social sciences, like
most work in history and in the natural sciences, is not directly concerned with the
furnishing of explanations’’ (p. 47). Even if it ‘‘may well be true,’’ he added, ‘‘as is
so often said, that the tasks of any empirical science are to explain, to predict, and to
apply’’, we would still need to recognise that ‘‘these tasks are embedded in a
workload that may be referred to as identification, classification, description; and
measuring and reporting as well’’ (p. 47).
To this list, we can add more. The practice of science is a human practice that, in
what it chooses to explain, describe, classify, identify, describe, measure and report,
also expresses what the scientist, and their laboratory or school, feels is important to
focus on. Further, those activities themselves are done in ways that reflect on the
values the person performing them espouses. We need not think, here, of salience or
values as something mysterious. Under the guise of humanist pragmatism, these are
simply expressive of the ways we relate with others and how we cope with what we
encounter. Of course, we do not always adopt them in a self-reflective manner;
sometimes we just perform them, mindlessly, taking on what those before us did.
Then, assisted by openness, we depend on others to tell us how what we do, and how
we do it, affects what they feel. Turner has done contemporary philosophy and
social science a great service by holding up a mirror to some forms of normativism;
he has given it the best gift one can: genuinely struggled with it, tried to give it
voice, and then said how he feels about it. He has also, in his best moments, helped
create a clearing where more fruitful dialogue between normativism and naturalism
can take place. Let us wait and see whether those who identify with normativism
can come to meet him there.
Let me add one final comment: there is a question that could be raised here
concerning whether it is appropriate to discuss Turner’s critique and positive
contribution from the perspective of a debate between normativism and
naturalism. After all, some might argue that Turner could also be seen, and
perhaps better understood, as attempting to move beyond that debate. This is a
perceptive remark, but the problem is that Turner’s way of moving beyond the
debate is questionable: it involves attributing to normativism a view that claims
priority and superiority over the natural. I have tried to argue that we can move
beyond the debate, and set up a dialogue, by incorporating softer forms of both
the normative (which involves making room for a kind of normativity without
inescapable norms) and the natural into different explanatory constellations that
can serve different purposes. Adding ‘humanism’ to this pragmatic pluralism
means that attention is paid to how engaging in scholarship is another
manifestation of how we relate to each other, how we live together. ‘Moving
beyond the debate’, then, is not a matter of dismissal and exclusion, but of finding
ways to work together. Finally, moving beyond the debate in this way may require
dropping the kind of dismissive and exclusionary talk of the ‘genuinely real’, the
‘really existing’, the ‘certainly true.’
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